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Abstract 
This paper compares the price effects of two influential airline mergers taking place in China 
in 2010. We offer the first comparative analysis of two different types of airline mergers in the 
Chinese airline market: a parallel merger and a complementary merger. With a difference-in-
differences approach, we found that the two types of mergers resulted in similar pricing patterns 
for the airlines involved in the mergers, suggesting that complementary mergers could also 
confer an increase in market power. It has been found that the negative impact of high-speed 
rail on fares gradually weakened after the mergers.   
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1. Introduction 
In 2010, two large-scale airline mergers took place in China: state-owned China Eastern 
completed its merger with Shanghai government-owned Shanghai Airlines (MU-FM), and Air 
China successfully increased its stake in Shenzhen Airlines from 25% to 51% (CA-ZH). Both 
China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines took Shanghai as their primary base and operated 
overlapping services on many routes in and out of Shanghai. Both of them suffered severe 
financial losses before the merger and their financial positions became exacerbated during the 
2008 global financial crisis (Zhang, 2015). This merger was supported and guided by the 
government, with an obvious purpose of eliminating head-to-head competition between the two, 
which would undoubtedly strengthen China Eastern’s dominant status at Shanghai’s Hongqiao 
and Pudong Airports. Before being taken over by Air China, Shenzhen Airlines was China’s 
largest private airline since 2005. However, China’s air transport policy had long been hostile 
to the private carriers (Zhang and Zhang, 2016), which in part resulted in Shenzhen Airlines’ 
poor financial performance. Seeking financial support was one of the motives for Shenzhen 
Airlines to receive a cash injection from Air China in 2010. By taking control of Shenzhen 
Airlines, Air China was able to extend its network and exert influence over the South China 
market, which was traditionally China Southern Airlines’ territory.1  
However, unlike the MU-FM merger whose aim was to strengthen China Eastern’s dominant 
status in Shanghai, Air China and Shenzhen Airlines were based in separate airports and their 
networks were largely complementary. Therefore, the CA-ZH merger was of complementary 
nature while the MU-FM case was regarded as a parallel merger. It should be noted that this 
does not necessarily mean that a complementary network has little or no overlap. In fact, Air 
China and Shenzhen Airlines had 82 overlap routes in 2009 and this number was 57 in 2011. 
The complementary nature mainly reflects the fact that the brand of Shenzhen Airlines 
continued to grow and expand post-merger. In contrast, the integration between China Eastern 
and Shanghai airlines was much deeper after the merger. The brand of Shanghai Airlines 
gradually weakened and even disappeared on many key routes out of Shanghai. In fact, 
 
1 Both Air China and China Southern had the intention to take over Shenzhen Airlines. However, Air China had 
already had equity in Shenzhen Airlines and was in a better financial position than China Southern in 2010. Air 
China had a much smaller presence in China’s domestic market than China Eastern and China Southern, 
particularly in South China. Improving its presence in Shenzhen and Guangzhou as well as South China was Air 
China’s key motivation of acquiring Shenzhen Airlines, which was the main reason that we label this takeover as 
a complementary merger. By increasing its equity in Shenzhen Airlines to 51%, Air China could effectively control 
this carrier at the lowest cost.  
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Shanghai Airlines has largely lost independence after the merger. In this sense, we label the 
China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines merger as parallel. 
   In the antitrust analysis of airline alliances, a complementary alliance is one where the two 
firms link their existing networks so as to feed traffic to each other and build a new 
complementary network to provide improved services for connecting passengers (Oum et al., 
1996; Park, 1997). In contrast, parallel alliances refer to collaboration between two firms that 
compete against each other on some routes of their network, that is, routes overlap. Only one 
airline of the alliance partners may provide services on any given route after they form an 
alliance. Park (1997) found that effects on airfares and consumer surplus are different for each 
type of alliance. For complementary alliances, Zou et al. (2011) showed the overall effects on 
airfare depend on the relative strengths of the airfare reducing effects due to cooperative pricing 
setting and the increased willingness to pay for services improvements. That is, they have both 
positive and negative effects on airfares. Although the appeal of mergers and of airline alliances 
is much the same for an airline, the same conclusion may not necessarily apply to the airline 
merger cases, given that alliances are frequently subject to instability (Oum et al., 2000), while 
a merger is usually irreversible and permanent. The two mergers with different route systems 
provide us with a great opportunity to examine their effects on airfares. 
Although the impact of mergers on airfares has been extensively studied in previous literature, 
research into the merger cases in the Chinese market is sporadic, mainly due to the 
unavailability of data. To the best of our knowledge, the CA-ZH merger has not been rigorously 
studied in the literature. Zhang (2015) is the only paper that examined the price effects of the 
MU-FM merger based on a small number of routes. Given that the two mergers took place 
roughly at the same time, and that merging parties, Air China and China Eastern, and the 
acquired parties, Shanghai and Shenzhen Airlines, are of similar size, it would be interesting to 
do a comparative analysis of their respective effects on the routes directly and indirectly 
affected. 
Although China introduced its Anti-Monopoly Law in 2008, the new antitrust enforcement 
agencies had limited resources and little experience in dealing with antitrust cases. All the 
airline mergers or code-sharing agreements have never been challenged, nor were any 
conditions imposed on the relevant parties. It appears that China’s state-owned airlines could 
enjoy a certain degree of market power through either explicit and implicit collusion, or mergers 
and acquisitions to defend their market share and eliminate potential competition from private 
carriers (Zhang and Zhang, 2016). Therefore, the lack of a general deterrent effect of the 
antitrust law gives us an opportunity of examining the pricing effects, which would be otherwise 
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suppressed by effective enforcement of anti-competitive laws in many developed economies. 
In this study, the price effects of the two mergers in China’s airline market will be examined 
and compared with a difference-in-differences approach. While one approach to gauging the 
effects of a merger is to study market-level fare changes on routes where the merger partners 
overlap (Dobson and Piga, 2013; Fageda and Perdiguero,2014; Huschelrath and Muller, 2014, 
2015; Shen, 2017; Carlton et al., 2019), this paper studies fare changes at the carrier level on 
routes served by at least one of the merger partners, following the same approach used in Kwoka 
and Shumilina (2010). The carrier-level effects are allowed to differ between the merger 
partner(s) and other carriers serving the route.2 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant studies on airline mergers and 
their effects. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 reports and interprets the 
main results. Section 5 contains the summary and concluding remarks. 
2. Literature Review 
A complex pattern of motives might exist for a single merger case. The managerial literature 
has voluminous discussions of the motives for mergers and acquisitions (Trautwein, 1990; 
Mukherjee et al., 2004; Zhang and Round, 2008; Geiger and Schiereck, 2014), among which 
the monopoly theory and efficiency theory are the most commonly investigated motives behind 
mergers. The monopoly theory concerns the pursuit of market power by lessening competition 
(Stigler,1964). A horizontal merger eliminates direct competition between the merging parties 
and thus has market power implication. The efficiency theory is associated with the acquisition 
of financial synergies, operational synergies, and managerial synergies, which was one of the 
motives pursued by most merging parties as noted in their annual financial reports (Chatterjee, 
1986; Farrell and Shapiro, 2000).  
From a theoretical perspective, in oligopolistic markets, a merger among directly competing 
firms is likely to result in higher prices unless there are significant efficiency gains associated 
with the merger (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990, 1991). However, 
there is an exception to this theory when merging firms are not direct competitors. Levy and 
Reitzes (1992) found that only a merger that involves neighboring products in the 
characteristics’ space may raise prices. That is, the more similar products merging parties 
produce, the higher prices post-merger. In the airline industry, the most common product 
differentiation is reflected through the network that airlines serve. Two airlines can be regarded 
 
2 We are indebted to one anonymous reviewer who helped us develop this statement. 
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as highly differentiated if their networks do not overlap (Dobson and Piga, 2009). Mergers 
among highly differentiated airlines are less likely to cause higher airfares since they do not 
alter the market competition situation. Empirically, few studies directly examined market power 
and cost savings after airline mergers. Most studies conclude that efficiency gains outweigh 
market power effects if fares decrease after a merger (Mizutani, 2011; Dobson and Piga, 2013; 
Carlton et al., 2019), and vice versa if fares increase after a merger (Borenstein, 1990; Werden 
et al., 1991; Huschelrath and Muller, 2014, 2015; Zhang, 2015; Shen, 2017).  
In the US, there were two waves of airline mergers. The first wave occurred in the 1980s 
following the airline deregulation (Borenstein, 1990; Werden et al., 1991; Kim and Singal, 1993; 
Morrison, 1996; Kwoka and Shumilkina, 2010). The second wave emerged in the new century 
when the landscape of the world airline industry had completely changed and airlines operated 
in a more deregulated and competitive environment (Brueckner et al., 2013; Luo, 2014; 
Huschelrath and Muller, 2014, 2015; Shen, 2017). As for the first merging wave in the 1980s, 
many mergers involving overlapped network were approved. In general, market power was 
detected following the mergers taking place during this period, especially when the merging 
firms had overlapping routes or if one party provided services and the other was a potential 
entrant. The US authorities have paid more attention to anti-competitive effects when 
investigating recent airline mergers. During this period, approved mergers were mainly those 
with complementary networks. Thus, for the mergers taking place during the second merging 
wave, fares generally decreased because of the dominance of efficiency gains. 
In the EU market, some papers reported significant price increases after airline mergers as a 
result of the increase in concentration and market power (Veldhius, 2005; Brueckner and Pels, 
2005; Gaggero and Piga, 2010). Other studies drew opposite conclusions. Dobson and Piga 
(2013) examined two low-cost airline mergers in Europe, i.e., EasyJet’s acquisition with Go 
Fly and Ryanair’s acquisition with Buzz. They found that after both mergers, fares were greatly 
reduced especially for those early booking tickets, largely due to the realization of immediate 
efficiency improvement following the mergers. Fageda and Perdiguero (2014) investigated the 
impact of a merger between a full-service airline and two LCCs in Spain. They found no 
significant changes in airfare on routes where the two LCCs competed before the merger, whilst 
price notably increased on routes where the full-service airline was competing with LCCs. In 
the Japanese market, Mizutani (2011) reported that the merger between Japan Airlines and 
Japan Air System significantly increased competition and reduced the price as after the merger, 
Japan Airlines was able to compete with the biggest Japanese airline group—All Nippon 
Airways more actively.  
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The research on Chinese airline mergers is very limited. Zhang and Round (2009) studied 
the airfare changes by China Eastern and China Southern after the 2002 airline consolidations 
and showed that the mergers did not trigger significant airfare increases. Zhang (2015) 
investigated the merger between China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines, both of which were 
encountering severe financial problems prior to the merger. Using the departure day price data, 
the author found that on average the prices increased by approximately 22% on the seven 
sample routes one year after the merger. 
One salient feature of this research is the rich data that allow us to do a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of the two mergers whose networks were of parallel and complementary 
nature, respectively. Our sample contains 280 most heavily traveled routes in the Chinese 
domestic market and covers a period from 2007 to 2016. As pointed out by Focarelli and Panetta 
(2003), a short post-merger period might fail to account for a merger’s long-run efficiency gains 
because of the harmonization of the organizational practices between the two merging firms. 
As both mergers occurred in 2010, the dataset covers a 3-year period before the mergers and a 
6-year period after the mergers, enabling us to study the anticompetitive issues from a relatively 
long-term perspective. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Construction of the dataset 
Our dataset was constructed using information from the IATA Airport Intelligence Services 
database. The dataset contains monthly non-stop domestic airline-route information on the 
origin, destination, monthly economy-class airfares and monthly number of passengers by 
routes and carriers, spanning from January 2005 to December 2016.3 Based on the Statistical 
Data on Civil Aviation of China (CAAC, 2015), we selected 280 most heavily travelled routes 
with each carrying at least 300,000 passengers in 2014.4 It must be noted that although there 
were 2,652 domestic air routes in 2014, these top 280 accounted for about two-thirds of the 
total traffic volume. We exclude all foreign airline tickets, first-class tickets, and any tickets 
that involve connecting points on any directional trip. Due to the incompleteness of route data 
in early periods, observations before April 2007 were dropped from the dataset. In line with 
 
3 The fares are for tickets actually purchased by economy-class passengers. They are extracted from the AirportIS 
database, which is constructed based on the reported information from IATA’s Billing and Settlement Plan (BSP).  
4 The number of passengers is the sum of the movements of both directions of the route.  
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previous literature, routes carrying less than 300 passengers a month were removed from the 
dataset. The dataset contains 42 Chinese airlines.5  
 In our analysis, we treat each route direction as a separate market, which is consistent with 
the view held in the airline industry. For example, the flight number and the passenger demand 
from Beijing to Shanghai are different from those for the Shanghai to Beijing flight. Overall, 
the unbalanced panel dataset contains monthly data ranging from April 2007 to December 2016, 
with 270,187 carrier-route-month level observations. The unbalanced panel causes no problem 
if the missing data are not correlated with idiosyncratic errors (Wooldridge, 2006). It is quite 
common for airline literature to use unbalanced panel data as airlines frequently suspend or 
discontinue services on many routes, particularly tourism routes. Individual airline- and route-
level fixed effects will be used to control for unobservables such as airlines’ network 
construction and flight schedule decisions. Time fixed effects will be applied to control for 
seasonal factors that affect route entry and exit. Therefore, it is believed the missing data 
problem will not cause serious bias in this study. As both mergers occurred in the first half of 
2010, the dataset contains a 3-year period before the mergers and a 6-year period after the 
mergers. 
3.2 The model 
Much literature has examined the price effects of a merger, for example, fare change rates (Kim 
and Singal, 1993), average price ratio changes (Barton and Sherman, 1984), and fare differences 
(Prager and Hannan, 1998; Vita and Sacher, 2001) before and after a merger. However, these 
studies largely ignored the permanent differences between the treatment group and the control 
group, which could be resolved with the difference-in-differences (DID) method. In the airline 
industry, the DID approach has been frequently used in previous research (Kwoka and 
Shumilina, 2010; Zhang, 2012; Fageda and Perdiguero, 2014；Aguzzoni et al., 2016; Shen, 
2017). Our paper also uses the DID method to investigate the fare effects of the mergers. It 
should be noted that the main focus of this study is not to analyze competition behavior at the 
route level. Rather, we focus on the analysis of fare changes at the carrier level on routes served 
by at least one of the merger partners. Following Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) and Le (2016), 
the basic model is given as follows. 
 ln (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ij + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 × 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ij + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿+ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. (1)  
 
 
5 The list of airlines contained in our sample is presented in Table A1 in Appendix A1. 
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In equation (1), subscripts 𝑦𝑦, j, and t represent specific airline, route and time, respectively. 
The vector 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 contains carrier-route level control variables such as airline’s market share on 
a specific route and variable NewMarket. The vector Xjt contains other route-level control 
variables such as population, GDP, distance, Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), LCC, HSR, 
and tourism (Hurdle et al., 1989; Kim and Singal, 1993; Zhang and Round, 2009; Kwoka and 
Shumilkina, 2010; Fageda and Perdiguero, 2014). 
The control variables included in the model are as follows. 
• MarketShare (MKS), a carrier-route level variable, measured as the logarithm of 
market share of airline i on route j in time t. To address the endogeneity issue, the 
one-period-lagged value of the variable is used in the regression. 
• NewMarket, a carrier-route level dummy variable that equals one when the merging 
airlines entered a new market (not served by the merging airlines in the pre-merger 
period) after the merger. 
• lnDistance, measured as the logarithm of route distance, is expected to have a 
negative sign because our dependent variable is average airfare per kilometer (yield). 
The route distance data can be found in the Statistical Data on Civil Aviation of China 
(2015). 
• lnPOP, a market-level variable measured as the logarithm of the geometric mean of 
city populations at the two endpoints of each route. The data of population are 
collected from the Chinese City Statistical Yearbook (2007-2016).6  
• lnGDP, a market-level variable measured as the logarithm of the geometric mean of 
city GDP at the two endpoints of each route. The data of GDP are collected from the 
Chinese City Statistical Yearbook (2007-2016). 
• Tourism, a market-level dummy variable, equals one for a tourist route. A tourist 
route is the one whose arrival destination is one of the top 30 Chinese cities with most 
developed tourism ranked by Forbes.  
• HHI is the market-level HHI in logarithmic form measuring market concentration. It 
is computed based on quarterly passenger volume carried by each airline on a route. 
In the airline economics literature, HHI is widely used to measure market competition 
as a proxy of market power (Zhang et al., 2020).  
• RivalNo is the number of non-merging rival airlines on route j at time t. 
 
6 We tried both registered population and total resident population data in the analysis. The results are highly 
consistent. 
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• LCC is a market-level dummy that takes the value of one if low-cost carriers (9C, 8L, 
AQ, PN, and KN) present on route j at time t. Its sign is expected to be negative. 
• HSR is a market-level dummy variable that takes the value of one if direct high-speed 
rail (HSR) service is available on route j at time t. Its sign is expected to be negative 
since HSR is regarded as a substitute for air services.7 
• 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 , and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 capture unobserved fix effects of airline, route, and time, respectively. 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 
The key objective of DID approach is the comparison between treatment group and control 
group. Before explaining our treatment and control groups, we first define two terms that we 
will use repeatedly in this section and throughout the rest of the paper. A product is defined at 
the carrier-route level as a combination of carrier, origin airport, and destination airport, 
representing the flight path a passenger could select to travel from his/her origin to destination 
on a specific carrier. A market is defined as a route connecting origin airport and destination 
airport which is independent of airlines. The treatment group in Model (1) is defined at the 
carrier-route level following Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010). The control group contains non-
merging airline-route products that are not affected by either the MU-FM merger or the CA-
ZH merger. Four types of products are included in the treatment group, namely, Overlap 
products, Potential products, Rival products, and Unrelated products. Table 1 gives the 
definitions of each type of products.8 
Table 1 The definitions of each type of products in the treatment group 
Products Definition 
 
7 HSR ticket prices did not change over time in China during the study period. For example, the fare for a second-
class HSR seat (analogous to an economy-class airline seat) from Beijing to Shanghai has been RMB 553 since 
its opening in 2011 until now. Therefore, we use the HSR dummy instead of the HSR fare in the model. 
8 Here are some examples to illustrate the concept of carrier-route level products. There were five airlines 
operating on the route “PEK (Beijing)-SHA (Shanghai)” in our dataset before the mergers. They were MU (China 
Eastern), FM (Shanghai Airlines), CA (Air China), CZ (China Southern), and HU (Hainan). Since both MU and 
FM operated on this route before the MU-FM merger, the Overlap dummy equals 1 for products “MU-PEK-SHA” 
and “FM-PEK-SHA” before and after the MU-FM merger. CA, CZ, HU were competing airlines on this route 
before the MU-FM merger. Therefore, the Rival dummy equals 1 for products “CA-PEK-SHA”, “CZ-PEK-SHA” 
and “HU-PEK-SHA” before and after the MU-FM merger. As for the Potential dummy, FM operated on the route 
“XMN(Xiamen)-WUS(Wuxi)” before the MU-FM merger while MU was not present on this route, but operated 
at the two endpoints— “XMN” and “WUS”. In this case, MU can potentially extend its service between “XMN” 
and “WUS”. Therefore, MU was a potential entrant to FM on the route “XMN-WUS”. Thus, the Potential dummy 
equals 1 for the product “FM-XMN-WUS”. As for the Unrelated dummy, CA operated on the route 
“FOC(Fuzhou)-CSX(Changsha)” before the CA-ZH merger while ZH was not present on this route, norat the two 
endpoints—“FOC” or “CSX”. In this case, the Unrelated dummy equals 1 for the product “CA-FOC-CSX”. 
Therefore, our models focus on the carrier-route combinations and each combination only involves the airline 
included. We did not create route level dummies such as overlap route, potential route, and unrelated route 
dummies.  
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Overlap An overlap product involves a route serviced by both Air China and 
Shenzhen Airlines before they merged, or by both China Eastern and 
Shanghai Airlines in the MU-FM case. 
Potential A potential product involves a route serviced by one of the merging 
airlines, with the other operating as a potential entrant serving one or 
both endpoints of the route. 
Rival A rival product refers to the situation where there was at least one non-
merging firm, competing with one or two merging carriers before the 
merger. 
Unrelated An unrelated product is a route served by one of the merging airlines, 
with the other carrier being neither a potential nor an actual competitor. 
The key focus of the DID approach is the interaction term of the dummy “Merger” and the 
dummy “Treatment products”. The interaction term in Model (1) for Overlap products and 
merger dummy could be positive because competition is supposed to be lessened after the 
merger on the overlap routes, resulting in increased market power and prices. A merger would 
eliminate the potential entry and further result in higher prices, and thereby the interaction term 
in Model (1) for Potential products and merger dummy is expected to be positive. The 
interaction term in Model (1) for Rival products and merger dummy could have a positive or 
negative sign. A reduction in the number of competitors following the merger can facilitate 
collusive behaviors among airlines, giving the rival airline the chance to raise airfares. However, 
it could be the case where the merging parties are too dominant after the merger and the rival 
airlines could not afford to charge higher prices as they may lose market shares by doing so. 
The interaction term of the unrelated products and merger dummy is expected to be negative or 
insignificant due to the likely efficiency gains. 
In Model (1), the dependent variable l𝑛𝑛 (𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined at the carrier-route product 
level. which is the logarithm of average airfare per kilometer on route j served by carrier i in 
time period t. To control for inflation during the study period, this variable is adjusted by 
consumer price index (CPI). . The calculation of ticket prices by carrier and route, rather than 
the average for all carriers on a route, is designed to permit analysis of the effect on the merging 
carrier’s pricing from the elimination of the other carrier as an actual competitor or potential 
competitor, and on the non-merging rival carriers’ pricing behavior. 𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is a dummy that 
equals 0 before the merger and equals 1 after the merger. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 of the DID model 
captures the pure price effect caused by mergers. 
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Since our goal is to analyze and compare different price effects caused by the two mergers, 
Model (1) will be run separately for the MU-FM merger and the CA-ZH merger. Tables 2 and 
3 show the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the MU-FM merger affected markets 
 Pre-merger Post-merger 
Variable  Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Price (RMB) 727.83 259.94 200.10 2,118.30 834.47 301.32 151.80 2,904.90 
Yield (RMB per 
km) 
0.61 0.25 0.10 3.64 0.68 0.24 0.18 6.28 
Distance (km) 1,127.50 520.80 254 3,278 1,150.41 516.44 254 3,278 
Population 
(10,000) 
801.37 396.86 77.43 2,338.16 836.15 407.68 80.00 2,417.08 
GDP (billion 
RMB) 
1,017.87 609.52 15.14 4,166.49 1,868.15 1,121.22 21.46 7,731.33 
HHI 3,104.37 1,099.33 1,115.51 1,0000 3,810.49 1,291.38 1,425.48 10,000 
MarketShare 0.30 0.21 0.004 1 0.22 0.17 0.0014 1 
RivalNo 2.81 1.22 0 7 4.13 1.75 0 11 
Overlap 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Potential 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Rival 0.57 0.50 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Unrelated - - - - - - - - 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for the CA-ZH merger affected markets 
 Pre-merger Post-merger 
Variable  Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Price (RMB) 746.09 267.86 200.10 2,028.60 853.60 307.23 151.80 2,904.90 
Yield (RMB per 
km) 
0.62 0.25 0.08 3.64 0.69 0.25 0.18 6.28 
Distance (km) 1,140.86 522.91 254 3,278 1,161.84 515.24 254 3,278 
Population 
(10,000) 
847.80 447.86 77.43 2,338.16 888.82 462.66 80.00 2,417.08 
GDP (billion 
RMB) 
1009.15 600.41 15.14 4,166.49 1,883.24 1,123.07 21.46 7,731.33 
HHI 3,155.98 1,183.29 1,115.51 10,000 3,847.87 1,328.80 1,425.48 10,000 
MarketShare 0.30 0.21 0.004 1 0.22 0.17 0.0014 1 
RivalNo 2.82 1.22 0 7 4.16 1.76 0 11 
Overlap 0.04 0.21 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Potential 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Rival 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Unrelated 0.0005 0.02 0 1 - - - - 
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4. Results 
4.1 The results of the baseline model 
We estimate the DID model using both random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) approaches. 
The Hausman test shows that the FE model should be adopted. But the random effects results 
are retained to illustrate the signs and coefficients of time-invariant variables such as route 
distance, tourism destination, NewMarket, etc. The results of our key variables remain robust 
no matter FE or RE is used. The time fixed effects (year and month dummies) are applied in all 
the regression specifications to control for common time trends and unobservable shocks 
throughout our sample period. Two methods are applied to deal with the endogeneity issue 
associated with the variable “HHI”. In Column (3) we replace the HHI with its one-period-
lagged value. In Column (4) the classical instrument introduced by Borenstein (1989) is used.9 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
Table 4 The Estimation Results for the MU-FM Merger 
 Dependent variable: lnYield 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RE FE FE FE+IV 
L.lnMKS 0.0058*** 0.0075*** 0.0078*** 0.0065*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Merger -0.0293*** -0.0320*** -0.0289*** -0.0503*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0069) 
Overlap 0.0295* - - - 
 (0.0155) (.) (.) (.) 
Rival -0.0236*** - - - 
 (0.0087) (.) (.) (.) 
Potential -0.0216* - - - 
 (0.0128) (.) (.) (.) 
NewMarket 0.0233 - - - 
 (0.0221) (.) (.) (.) 
Merger*Overlap 0.0616*** 0.0675*** 0.0621*** 0.0906*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0062) 
Merger*Rival 0.0749*** 0.0779*** 0.0750*** 0.0983*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0056) 
Merger*Potential 0.0505*** 0.0526*** 0.0509*** 0.0742*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0060) 
 
9 The instrument for route level HHI in Borenstein (1989) is the square of the fitted value of route market share 
(from its first-stage regression) plus the “rescaled” sum of the squares of all other carrier’s shares. 
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RivalNo -0.0317*** -0.0323*** -0.0306*** -0.0335*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
lnHHI 0.0231*** 0.0178***  0.0043* 
 (0.0023) (0.0023)  (0.0023) 
L.lnHHI   0.0344***  
   (0.0021)  
lnDistance -0.4640*** - - - 
 (0.0068) (.) (.) (.) 
lnPOP -0.0322*** 0.1029*** 0.0940*** 0.1222*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
lnGDP 0.0398*** 0.0437*** 0.0456*** 0.0527*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
HSR -0.0085*** -0.0069*** -0.0073*** -0.0071*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
LCC -0.0090*** -0.0101*** -0.0096*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Tourism -0.0208*** - - - 
 (0.0076) (.) (.) (.) 
Constant 2.7488*** -1.3275*** -1.4252*** -1.3922*** 
 (0.0558) (0.0842) (0.0840) (0.0845) 
N 196020 196020 196020 194885 
R2 0.336 0.330 0.331 - 
1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of year and month dummies and other control variables are not reported. 
 
Table 5 The Estimation Results for the CA-ZH Merger 
 Dependent variable: lnYield 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RE FE FE FE+IV 
L.lnMKS 0.0073*** 0.0088*** 0.0092*** 0.0080*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Merger -0.0233*** -0.0250*** -0.0229*** -0.0435*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0060) 
Overlap 0.0283 - - - 
 (0.0179) (.) (.) (.) 
Rival 0.0059 - - - 
 (0.0085) (.) (.) (.) 
Potential 0.0143 - - - 
 (0.0115) (.) (.) (.) 
NewMarket -0.0121 - - - 
 (0.0174) (.) (.) (.) 
Unrelated -0.1207 - - - 
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 (0.1340) (.) (.) (.) 
Merger*Overlap 0.0734*** 0.0709*** 0.0658*** 0.0913*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0068) 
Merger*Rival 0.0595*** 0.0616*** 0.0589*** 0.0812*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0055) 
Merger*Potential 0.0679*** 0.0694*** 0.0667*** 0.0885*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0058) 
RivalNo -0.0296*** -0.0300*** -0.0292*** -0.0310*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
lnHHI 0.0441*** 0.0397***  0.0285*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0022)  (0.0023) 
lnDistance -0.4564*** - - - 
 (0.0065) (.) (.) (.) 
lnPOP -0.0398*** 0.0754*** 0.0672*** 0.0911*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
lnGDP 0.0426*** 0.0511*** 0.0531*** 0.0584*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) 
HSR -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0011 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
LCC -0.0088*** -0.0097*** -0.0091*** -0.0104*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Tourism -0.0161** - - - 
 (0.0074) (.) (.) (.) 
L.lnHHI   0.0530***  
   (0.0020)  
Constant 2.5417*** -1.3753*** -1.4481*** -1.4262*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0754) (0.0750) (0.0756) 
N 211447 211447 211447 209920 
R2 0.323 0.321 0.322 - 
 
1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of year and month dummies and other control variables are not reported. 
 
As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the coefficients of Merger*Overlap are significantly positive, 
which implies that the mergers were positively associated with the yields for Overlap products. 
The coefficient of Merger*Potential is statistically significant in all four specifications with 
smaller magnitudes compared with the coefficients of Merger*Overlap, which is consistent 
with previous studies such as Borenstein (1990), Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010), and Fageda 
and Perdiguero (2014). For years China Eastern had cut-throat competition with Shanghai 
Airlines and Air China in the key markets such as the Beijing-Shanghai route (Zhang, 2015; 
15 
 
Ho et al., 2018). The merger can mitigate competition by eliminating an effective competitor. 
At the route level, it would be easier for them to engage in collusion with a smaller number of 
airlines after the merger. In fact, Chinese carriers have a tradition of holding periodic 
negotiations to prevent price wars (Zhang and Round, 2011). Ho at al. (2018) found that the 
announcement of the merger between China Eastern and Shanghai Airlines led to the rise of the 
stock prices of Air China, suggesting potential market power gains for the rival airlines. As 
such implications will be fully understood by investors, rival firms’ stock prices will be bid up 
in the anticipation of higher profits in the affected market (Hosken and Simpson, 2001).  
Lastly, the coefficients of Merger*Rival in both tables are significantly positive. However, 
the Rival products in the MU-FM case may contain products that could be affected by the CA-
ZH merger and this may also be the case for the Rival products in the CA-ZH merger. In other 
words, the Rival results can be contaminated since the carrier-route observations from the other 
merger exist in the rival groups. As a result, the magnitude of the Rival product coefficient 
could be over-estimated. For instance, on the Beijing (PEK)-Shanghai (SHA) route, the Rival 
product “CZ-PEK-SHA” of the MU-FM merger is also the Rival product of the CA-ZH merger. 
In this case, it is not certain which merger caused the price change for the Rival product “CZ-
PEK-SHA”. To obtain the pure price effect of the Rival products, we conduct a robustness test 
by removing the CA-ZH products from MU-FM’s Rival products and removing the MU-FM 
products from CA-ZH’s Rival products. The results are shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
Table 6 The Estimation Results for the MU-FM Merger with the New Rival Group 
 Dependent variable: lnYield 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RE FE FE FE+IV 
L.lnMKS 0.0037*** 0.0056*** 0.0058*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Merger -0.0202*** -0.0231*** -0.0203*** -0.0417*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0073) 
Overlap 0.0290* - - - 
 (0.0156) (.) (.) (.) 
Rival -0.0315*** - - - 
 (0.0093) (.) (.) (.) 
Potential -0.0213* - - - 
 (0.0129) (.) (.) (.) 
NewMarket 0.0226 - - - 
 (0.0223) (.) (.) (.) 
Merger*Overlap 0.0605*** 0.0663*** 0.0616*** 0.0902*** 
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 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0063) 
Merger*Rival 0.0697*** 0.0729*** 0.0706*** 0.0937*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0057) 
Merger*Potential 0.0503*** 0.0524*** 0.0509*** 0.0742*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0061) 
RivalNo -0.0311*** -0.0318*** -0.0305*** -0.0332*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
lnHHI 0.0257*** 0.0208***  0.0059** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025)  (0.0026) 
lnDistance -0.4651*** - - - 
 (0.0073) (.) (.) (.) 
lnPOP -0.0374*** 0.0978*** 0.0904*** 0.1215*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
lnGDP 0.0421*** 0.0463*** 0.0481*** 0.0565*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
HSR -0.0111*** -0.0095*** -0.0099*** -0.0097*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
LCC -0.0063*** -0.0063*** -0.0055** -0.0073*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Tourism -0.0209** - - - 
 (0.0081) (.) (.) (.) 
L.lnHHI   0.0353***  
   (0.0023)  
Constant 2.7513*** -1.3363*** -1.4241*** -1.4233*** 
 (0.0601) (0.0954) (0.0951) (0.0958) 
N 168999 168999 168999 167865 
R2 0.330 0.339 0.340 - 
1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of year and month dummies and other control variables are not reported. 
 
 
Table 7 The Estimation Results for the CA-ZH Merger with the New Rival Group 
 Dependent variable: lnYield 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RE FE FE FE+IV 
L.lnMKS 0.0115*** 0.0133*** 0.0143*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Merger -0.0228*** -0.0245*** -0.0221*** -0.0424*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0061) 
Overlap 0.0264 - - - 
 (0.0182) (.) (.) (.) 
Rival 0.0014 - - - 
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 (0.0090) (.) (.) (.) 
Potential 0.0106 - - - 
 (0.0117) (.) (.) (.) 
NewMarket -0.0138 - - - 
 (0.0178) (.) (.) (.) 
Unrelated -0.1261 - - - 
 (0.1368) (.) (.) (.) 
Merger*Overlap 0.0715*** 0.0688*** 0.0628*** 0.0891*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0069) 
Merger*Rival 0.0595*** 0.0618*** 0.0588*** 0.0805*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0056) 
Merger*Potential 0.0668*** 0.0689*** 0.0657*** 0.0879*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0058) 
RivalNo -0.0293*** -0.0298*** -0.0288*** -0.0306*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
lnHHI 0.0475*** 0.0422***  0.0328*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0025)  (0.0025) 
lnDistance -0.4529*** - - - 
 (0.0070) (.) (.) (.) 
lnPOP -0.0379*** 0.0975*** 0.0868*** 0.1034*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
lnGDP 0.0433*** 0.0587*** 0.0604*** 0.0649*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
HSR 0.0015 0.0031* 0.0025 0.0022 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
LCC -0.0127*** -0.0132*** -0.0127*** -0.0141*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) 
Tourism -0.0184** - - - 
 (0.0080) (.) (.) (.) 
L.lnHHI   0.0579***  
   (0.0023)  
Constant 2.4902*** -1.5748*** -1.6493*** -1.5703*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0812) (0.0808) (0.0814) 
N 180014 180014 180014 178654 
R2 0.323 0.318 0.320 - 
1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of year and month dummies and other control variables are not reported. 
 
Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient magnitudes of the Rival product become 
slightly smaller in Tables 6 and 7. The price change of the Rival products in the MU-FM merger 
was larger than that in the CA-ZH merger. These results have anti-competitive implications. 
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When merging firms are able to raise prices through collusion or dominant firm status after the 
merger, rival firms will also benefit from the merger. It appears that the rival airlines have 
gained a certain degree of market power after the mergers through easier price collusion 
resulting from higher concentration. Due to the overlapping nature of the MU-FM merger, it 
seems that the merging parties’ rival airlines also enjoyed higher market power than CA-ZH’s 
rivals.  
We now look at the results for the control variables. First, the coefficients of NewMarket in 
both Tables 6 and 7 are statistically insignificant. This means that when the merged airlines 
entered new markets after the mergers, they did not seem to be able to charge higher prices for 
the new services. Second, the coefficients of the distance variable are negative and statistically 
significant in all the regressions for both mergers, suggesting that the yield decreases as distance 
increases due to the well-known distance effect. Third, the coefficients of the tourism dummy 
are statistically negative in the RE models for both mergers. This finding is not unexpected 
since a large proportion of the tourists tend to be price sensitive. Fourth, the variable of 
population is significantly positive in the FE models. The impact of population on fares could 
be twofold. On one hand, it picks up the demand effect. That is, higher population implies 
higher air travel demand, resulting in higher airfares in the relevant markets. On the other hand, 
it can pick up the supply effect. Larger market size can result in economies of density and drives 
down costs and hence fares in the airline industry. The results of the population variable show 
that the demand effect dominates. Fifth, the coefficients associated with the LCC dummy are 
negative and statistically significant in all cases, implying that the presence of LCCs on a route 
can lead to a reduction in fares. The result is consistent with previous LCC literature (Fageda 
and Perdiguero, 2014; Luo, 2014; Huschelrath and Muller, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014, 2017; Fu 
et al., 2015). Sixth, the coefficient of GDP is positive which is reasonable that airfare increases 
as the national income grows. Lastly, in both mergers, the coefficients of route HHI are 
consistently positive and significant, which suggests that increased market concentration due 
to the mergers are associated with higher product prices. The HHI has been commonly used as 
a proxy for competition (Lijesen, 2004; Choo et al., 2018; Manuela et al., 2019). The results of 
route HHI show that the increased market concentration as a result of the merger can be one of 
the sources of market power in China’s airline market. The market share variable’s coefficient 
is positive and significant, implying that a rise in market share as a result of the merger can lead 
to increased unilateral market power and higher prices at the carrier-route, or product level.  
4.2 The impact of HSR 
19 
 
One noteworthy result is the coefficients of HSR in both merger cases. The sign of HSR in the 
MU-FM merger is negative with small magnitudes and the sign of HSR in the CA-ZH merger 
is positive or insignificant. Since HSR is considered as a strong substitute for airlines, 
competition should be enhanced on air routes with parallel HSR services and thus airfares 
should be significantly reduced. To further investigate the impact of HSR, we add an interaction 
term of HSR and the number of quarters after HSR entered each of the airline markets into 
Model (1). This allows us to understand how HSR impacted airfares over time. The results are 
shown in Tables 8 and 9.  
Table 8 The Estimation Results of the MU-FM Merger with HSR Lag Effects 
 Dependent variable: lnYield 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RE FE FE FE+IV 
L.lnMKS 0.0037*** 0.0056*** 0.0057*** 0.0044*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Merger -0.0181*** -0.0215*** -0.0188*** -0.0401*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0073) 
Overlap 0.0268* - - - 
 (0.0156) (.) (.) (.) 
Rival -0.0328*** - - - 
 (0.0093) (.) (.) (.) 
Potential -0.0224* - - - 
 (0.0128) (.) (.) (.) 
NewMarket 0.0227 - - - 
 (0.0223) (.) (.) (.) 
Merger*Overlap 0.0590*** 0.0657*** 0.0610*** 0.0897*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0063) 
Merger*Rival 0.0694*** 0.0731*** 0.0708*** 0.0940*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0057) 
Merger*Potential 0.0488*** 0.0513*** 0.0498*** 0.0732*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0060) 
RivalNo -0.0306*** -0.0313*** -0.0300*** -0.0327*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
lnHHI 0.0243*** 0.0192***  0.0042* 
 (0.0025) (0.0025)  (0.0026) 
lnDistance -0.4659*** - - - 
 (0.0073) (.) (.) (.) 
lnPOP -0.0377*** 0.1159*** 0.1085*** 0.1400*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
lnGDP 0.0441*** 0.0518*** 0.0535*** 0.0622*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
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HSR -0.0485*** -0.0474*** -0.0474*** -0.0482*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
HSR*Quarter 0.0069*** 0.0071*** 0.0070*** 0.0072*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
LCC -0.0059*** -0.0061*** -0.0053** -0.0071*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Tourism -0.0244*** - - - 
 (0.0081) (.) (.) (.) 
L.lnHHI   0.0335***  
   (0.0023)  
Constant 2.7624*** -1.4716*** -1.5568*** -1.5621*** 
 (0.0600) (0.0954) (0.0951) (0.0957) 
N 168999 168999 168999 167865 
R2 0.345 0.342 0.342 - 
1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of year and month dummies and other control variables are not reported. 
 
Table 9 The Estimation Results of the CA-ZH Merger with HSR Lag Effects 
 Dependent variable: lnYield 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RE FE FE IV 
L.lnMKS 0.0117*** 0.0135*** 0.0144*** 0.0128*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Merger -0.0204*** -0.0224*** -0.0201*** -0.0404*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0061) 
Overlap 0.0237 - - - 
 (0.0182) (.) (.) (.) 
Rival 0.0003 - - - 
 (0.0090) (.) (.) (.) 
Potential 0.0097 - - - 
 (0.0117) (.) (.) (.) 
NewMarket -0.0163 - - - 
 (0.0178) (.) (.) (.) 
Unrelated -0.1279 - - - 
 (0.1366) (.) (.) (.) 
Merger*Overlap 0.0704*** 0.0672*** 0.0614*** 0.0877*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0069) 
Merger*Rival 0.0590*** 0.0616*** 0.0587*** 0.0804*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0055) 
Merger*Potential 0.0644*** 0.0667*** 0.0636*** 0.0859*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0058) 
RivalNo -0.0284*** -0.0289*** -0.0279*** -0.0296*** 
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 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
lnHHI 0.0473*** 0.0417***  0.0321*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0025)  (0.0025) 
lnDistance -0.4538*** - - - 
 (0.0070) (.) (.) (.) 
lnPOP -0.0383*** 0.1169*** 0.1063*** 0.1231*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
lnGDP 0.0466*** 0.0674*** 0.0690*** 0.0739*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0051) 
HSR -0.0400*** -0.0396*** -0.0397*** -0.0410*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
HSR*Quarter 0.0078*** 0.0081*** 0.0080*** 0.0082*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
LCC -0.0115*** -0.0119*** -0.0114*** -0.0128*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Tourism -0.0231*** - - - 
 (0.0079) (.) (.) (.) 
L.lnHHI   0.0568***  
   (0.0023)  
Constant 2.4855*** -1.7475*** -1.8169*** -1.7448*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0812) (0.0808) (0.0814) 
N 180014 180014 180014 178654 
R2 0.320 0.322 0.323 - 
1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of year and month dummies and other control variables are not reported. 
 
All the variables except for HSR are consistent with Tables 6 and 7. It can be seen that the 
HSR entry resulted in a significant reduction in fares. However, the interaction term 
HSR*Quarter is significantly positive although the magnitude is relatively small, meaning that 
as time elapsed, the negative impact of HSR on airfare would gradually weaken. When HSR 
first entered the markets parallel to airline services, it posed a strong competitive pressure on 
air travel demand, pushing leftward the demand curve. However, over time, airlines could 
respond to the entry of HSR by developing new strategies such as reducing frequency and 
capacity, and charging higher prices to price-insensitive passengers as HSR may not be a good 
substitute to these passengers. For example, the capacity on the Beijing-Ningbo route decreased 
by 38% two years after the entry of HSR. These adjustments could shift the supply curve to the 
left and help limit the further decline of the equilibrium price.  
In addition, Zhang (2011) noted that with the opening of HSR between Beijing and Shanghai, 
major airlines on this route closely monitored the bookings and adjusted the airfares accordingly 
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to maintain a certain level of load factor. This means that immediately after the opening of HSR 
services, airlines were unlikely to charge higher prices. However, while HSR poses a threat to 
air transport along some routes, it can also be used to provide feeding services to long-haul air 
services in hub airports, particularly in hub airports with HSR stations (Albalate et al., 2015). 
China Eastern introduced the air-rail service in 2012, which allowed passengers living in nearby 
cities such as Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Wuxi to use HSR to and from Shanghai Hongqiao airport. 
The air-rail service was extended to China Eastern’s other hub airports such as Wuhan in 2014. 
Air China has followed suit and introduced the air-rail service at the airports of Shanghai and 
Chengdu in the last few years. Since 2013, Spring Airlines has been reimbursing Beijing 
passengers flying to/from Shijiazhuang airport (the airline’s hub) for their round-trip HSR 
tickets between Beijing and Shijiazhuang (Xia et al., 2018). In 2017, the Director of CAAC 
announced that some flights from the second- and third-tier cities to Beijing would be shifted 
to Tianjin and Shijiazhuang in the future and these airports will be linked to Beijing via HSR. 
In May 2018, China Railway Corporation and CAAC signed a strategic cooperation agreement 
on advancing air-rail intermodal transport. With deeper integration between air and rail services, 
the threat of HSR to airlines diminishes.10  
4.3 Disentangling two mergers’ effects 
Since the two mergers took place in the same year, it might be difficult to disentangle the pure 
impacts of each merger. Therefore, in the previous analysis, we interpreted the results with 
caution to avoid over-stating the causal effects. In this section, we further tried other measures 
as a robustness test to disentangle the effects of the two mergers, following the method used in 
Vaze et al. (2017). Specifically, we separate each type of products by creating two dummies. 
For example, the dummy variable “Overlap” is divided into “Overlap_own” and 
“Overlap_common”. “Overlap_own” refers to the Overlap products provided by the airline(s) 
from one of the two merging groups, and “Overlap_common” refers to the Overlap products 
jointly provided by airlines from both merging groups. The dummies of “Potential” and “Rival” 
products are treated in the same way. We use the Beijing (PEK)-Shanghai (SHA) route as an 
example to explain this treatment. “PEK-SHA” was served by CA, MU, and FM before the 
merger. Therefore, the products “CZ-PEK-SHA” and “HU-PEK-SHA” were regarded as both 
 
10 The improvement in air service quality in response to the HSR entry could be a significant factor that led to 
price increase. Fu et al. (2018) reported that HSR competition in China indeed reduces flight delays. Specifically, 
on the short-haul routes within a 2-hour HSR ride, the average delay time of airlines decreases by 6.71%. On the 
medium-to-long-haul routes with 2 to 5-hour HSR ride, airline delay time on average decreases by 3.32%. 
Unfortunately, due to the data unavailability constraints, we are unable to include a service quality variable in our 
model, which is a limitation of this study. 
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CA-ZH and MU-FM mergers’ rivals in our previous analysis. In the new robustness test, these 
products which are both CA-ZH and MU-FM mergers’ rivals are labeled as “Rival_common”. 
Also note that the control groups contain non-merging carriers on the routes not affected by 
either the CA-ZH merger or the MU-FM merger. We rerun the DID model with the interaction 
terms of the mergers and the new product dummies. By reconstructing our treatment groups by 
dividing the products into two categories: one only relevant to one merger; and one related with 
both mergers, we are able to disentangle the impacts of the two mergers. The results are shown 
in Tables 10 and 11.  
Table 10 The Robustness Test Results of the MU-FM Merger 
 Dependent variable: lnYield 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
RE FE 
L.lnMKS 0.0067*** 0.0084*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
NewMarket 0.0302 - 
 (0.0219) (.) 
RivalNo -0.0290*** -0.0293*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Merger -0.0244*** -0.0271*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0063) 
Overlap_own 0.0339 - 
 (0.0416) (.) 
Overlap_common 0.0370 - 
 (0.0561) (.) 
Rival_own -0.0137 - 
 (0.0398) (.) 
Rival_common -0.0113 - 
 (0.0397) (.) 
Potential_own -0.0315 - 
 (0.0451) (.) 
Potential_common -0.0012 - 
 (0.0409) (.) 
Overlap_own*Merger 0.0409*** 0.0469*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0055) 
Overlap_common*Merger 0.1840*** 0.1886*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0095) 
Rival_own*Merger 0.0636*** 0.0668*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0050) 
Rival_common*Merger 0.0796*** 0.0823*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0049) 
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Potential_own*Merger 0.0245*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Potential_common*Merger 0.0552*** 0.0571*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) 
L.lnHHI 0.0352*** 0.0322*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) 
lnDistance -0.4642*** - 
 (0.0066) (.) 
lnPOP 0.0235*** 0.0948*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0150) 
lnGDP 0.0228*** 0.0469*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0048) 
HSR -0.0535*** -0.0522*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) 
HSR*Quarter 0.0080*** 0.0082*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
LCC -0.0104*** -0.0096*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Tourism -0.0323*** - 
 (0.0074) (.) 
Constant 2.3929*** -1.4382*** 
 (0.0697) (0.1003) 
R2 0.569 0.336 
1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of year and month dummies and other control variables are not reported. 
 
Table 11 The Robustness Test Results of the CA-ZH Merger 
 Dependent variable: lnYield 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
RE FE 
L.lnMKS 0.0072*** 0.0089*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
NewMarket -0.0146 - 
 (0.0175) (.) 
RivalNo -0.0276*** -0.0279*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Unrelated -0.1102 - 
 (0.1379) (.) 
Merger -0.0231*** -0.0248*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0052) 
Overlap_own 0.0059 - 
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 (0.0380) (.) 
Overlap_common 0.0091 - 
 (0.0539) (.) 
Rival_own -0.0031 - 
 (0.0342) (.) 
Rival_common -0.0345 - 
 (0.0341) (.) 
Potential_own 0.0186 - 
 (0.0365) (.) 
Potential_common -0.0310 - 
 (0.0355) (.) 
Overlap_own*Merger 0.0604*** 0.0613*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) 
Overlap_common*Merger 0.1201*** 0.1248*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0108) 
Rival_own*Merger 0.0478*** 0.0495*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Rival_common*Merger 0.0717*** 0.0738*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0048) 
Potential_own*Merger 0.0411*** 0.0428*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Potential_common*Merger 0.0842*** 0.0860*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0053) 
L.lnHHI 0.0543*** 0.0523*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) 
lnDistance -0.4602*** - 
 (0.0064) (.) 
lnPOP 0.0070 0.0603*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0131) 
lnGDP 0.0300*** 0.0628*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0046) 
HSR -0.0418*** -0.0406*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) 
HSR*Quarter 0.0072*** 0.0074*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
LCC -0.0086*** -0.0066*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Tourism -0.0319*** - 
 (0.0073) (.) 
Constant 2.2954*** -1.4729*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0895) 
R2 0.570 0.326 
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1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of year and month dummies and other control variables are not reported. 
The results in Tables 10 and 11 are generally consistent with other tables. It is worth noting that 
the coefficients of the interaction terms only relevant to one merger are smaller than those 
associated with two mergers. This makes sense as for the products associated with both mergers, 
two primary competitors rather than one were eliminated in the post-merger period, which 
would cause more severe anti-competitive effect and higher carrier-route airfares. For the 
products associated with only one merger, the results show that the MU-FM merger alone could 
cause a rise in prices by 4.7%, 6.7% and 2.8% for the Overlap, Rival and Potential products, 
respectively. In contrast, the CA-ZH merger alone could result in an increase in fares by 6.1%, 
5.0% and 4.3%, respectively for each of the three products. As there was a large number of 
Potential products on the non-overlap routes in the CA-ZH merger, eliminating the potential 
competitors on these routes is found to have caused a greater rise in prices than in the case of 
MU and FM. This result again confirms our previous finding that the CA-ZH merger had anti-
competitive effects despite its complementary nature. All other control variables remain robust 
and consistent with those in previous tables. 
4.4 Lag effect of mergers 
Another issue that needs to be considered is that the magnitudes of the price effect caused by 
mergers might change over time. There are some papers comparing the short-term and long-
term effects of mergers in the US airline market (Morrison, 1996; Huschelrath and Muller, 
2014). It would be interesting to investigate airline pricing patterns following the mergers in 
the Chinese airline market. We further analyze the lag effects of the two mergers by 
incorporating interaction terms of post-merger year dummies and product type dummies in our 
model. Airline-route fixed effects and time fixed effects are controlled for in the regressions. 
The trends are presented in Figures 1 and 2.  
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Figure 1 Coefficients of T*Overlap, T*Rival, and T*Potential in the MU-FM merger 
 
 
Figure 2 Coefficients of T*Overlap, T*Rival, and T*Potential in the CA-ZH merger 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show that in the first two years after the mergers, airfares of most of the 
merger-affected products decreased, suggesting the merged parties and their rival carriers did 
not exercise any significant market power immediately after mergers. However, the prices of 
various carrier-route products in both mergers began to rise three years after the mergers. The 
longer the time that has elapsed since the mergers, the larger the magnitudes of the price 
increases, particularly for the Overlap products in the MU-FM merger. The CA-ZH merger 
roughly followed the same pattern, despite its complementary nature. In the antitrust analysis 
of airline consolidation, it is widely acknowledged that a complementary merger enables 
partners to attract more passengers by improving their connecting services and decreasing fares 
for connecting services. New demands can be created or taken from the existing connecting 
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passengers of rival airlines. In contrast, parallel mergers are likely to decrease total output and 
increase fares and have significant anticompetitive implications (Oum et al., 2000; Yan et al., 
2016). However, our results suggest the two different types of mergers in China generated 
similar results. That is, both mergers resulted in a reduction in fares initially and then a rise in 
prices two years later. Our results are in line with Zou et al. (2011), who empirically found that 
airline alliances allow airlines to charge higher prices on complementary routes. 
As a complement to the above reported results, we will now examine how the merging 
airlines exercised market power in the years following the mergers and check whether the trend 
is consistent with those reported in Figures 1 and 2. Market power can be measured by the 
Lerner index (Lerner, 1934; Choo et al., 2018; Manuela et al., 2019). HHI has been used to 
proxy market power (Zhang et al., 2020). However, Borenstein et al. (1999) and Li et al. (2019) 
pointed out that concentration measures correlate to market power only under certain market 
conditions and the more direct way to assess market power is to use the Lerner index. We 
therefore calculate the Lerner index of Air China and China Eastern on a yearly basis for the 
period 2007-2016.11 
 The Lerner index is defined as:  
 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)/𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (2) 
where Lijt  is the Lerner index of carrier i  on route j  in time period t , Pijt is the per-
passenger price of airline i on route j in period t, and MCijt is the corresponding marginal 
cost. The larger values of Lijt indicate stronger market power of firm i on route j in period t. 
To calculate the route-specific marginal cost, we follow the methodology proposed by 
Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993), and subsequently used in Zhang et al. (2013, 2014). 
 
  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)−𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, (3) 
                
where Dj is the distance of route j, AFLit is the average distance flown by carrier i in period 
t, CPKit is the cost per passenger-kilometer of carrier i in period t, and θ is an unknown 
parameter in the cost function that ranges from 0 to 1. Zhang et al. (2014) estimated the value 
of θ using the data from China’s airline industry and suggest that θ is around 0.4, a value that 
is very close to that reported in Oum et al. (1993) and Murakami (2011). Following the method 
used in Zhang et al. (2014), the value of θ calculated using our sample is 0.49.12 The annual 
 
11 Owing to the unavailability of the financial data and operating cost data for Shanghai Airlines and Shenzhen 
Airlines, Lerner indices are only calculated for Air China and China Eastern, the two acquiring carriers. 
12 Please refer to the appendix for the details of the estimation methodology.  
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financial reports of Air China and China Eastern are used to gather relevant data to calculate CPKit and AFLit. The average values of Lerner indices for Air China and China Eastern are 
shown in Figure 3. The average values of Lerner indices for Overlap and Potential products of 
China Eastern and Air China are shown in Figures 4 and 5.  
 
Figure 3 Lerner indices of China Eastern and Air China 
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Figure 4 Lerner indices for Overlap and Potential products of MU 
 
 
Figure 5 Lerner indices for Overlap and Potential products of CA 
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It can be seen in Figure 3 that the Lerner indices of both China Eastern and Air China exhibit 
a rising trend after a fall since the mergers occurred. The Lerner index values were larger in the 
long term, indicating that substantial market power might not have arisen shortly after the 
merger. Rather, market power only started to build up a few years after the merger. As can be 
seen from Figures 4 and 5, the Lerner indices of the Overlap products and Potential products 
also decreased first and then increased. The increase of Overlap products is slightly larger than 
that of Potential products, which is consistent with the regression results. The patterns of the 
Lerner indices are also consistent with the findings presented in Figures 1 and 2, which further 
confirm that market power gradually emerged in the long term rather than immediately after 
the mergers.   
 It appears that the long-run post-merger pricing behavior in the Chinese market is quite 
different from what has been observed in the US market. Huschelrath and Muller (2015) found 
that in the long term, the price increased by about 3% on the routes affected by the Delta-
Northwest merger compared with 11% in the short term. They concluded that post-merger entry 
by competitors might have led to a downward trend in the ticket price in the long run.  
Unlike the Delta-Northwest merger, Air China and China Eastern did not experience 
significant price rises shortly after the mergers. Zhang and Zhang (2017) found that there was 
no significant improvement in operating efficiency for the period 2010-2014 for Air China and 
China Eastern. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute the initial post-merger price reduction to any 
efficiency gains. The most likely reason is the entry of HSR: in the early years after the mergers, 
the whole air transport industry was very vigilant to the entry of HSR and refrained from 
charging higher prices, while in the subsequent years, airlines were able to adjust their capacity 
and competitive strategies to accommodate the existence of HSR and thus raised their prices. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the prices of the airlines involved in the mergers 
increased substantially in the later periods after the mergers.  
Another possible reason for the greater market power in the long-term is associated with the 
presence of entry regulation and barriers, especially for those densely travelled markets. Ma et 
al. (2020) reported strong evidence that Chinese airlines engage in implicit collusion in densely 
travelled and high revenue markets. These markets are usually associated with the presence of 
HSR. In the last decade, the emergence of HSR has given China’s airline industry and the 
aviation authorities an excuse to restrict the new entry to the densely travelled routes connecting 
with Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai. It may take years for private airlines and LCCs to gain 
access to these markets. For example, the Shanghai-based LCC, Spring Airlines, had to wait 
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for six years before getting approval to fly the Shanghai-Beijing route in 2011 and it was more 
difficult to gain an ideal time slot (Zhang and Lu, 2013; Wu et al., 2020). Actually, the total 
market share of LCCs in the Chinese aviation market was approximately 11% in 2018, which 
is significantly lower than the world’s average. As Fu et al. (2011) stated, in the presence of 
entry regulation and barriers, it is likely that market power and high prices could sustain.  
It is worth noting that for both China Eastern and Air China, the Lerner index peaked during 
the 2009-2010 period.13 One critical factor that affects the Lerner index is marginal cost. As 
Manuela et al. (2019) pointed out, the Lerner index will also increase even when prices are 
stable or slightly decreasing due to intense competition, if costs decrease faster relative to the 
decrease in airfares. From 2009 to 2010, fuel prices dramatically dropped, which might have 
led to a great decrease in airlines’ operation costs and marginal costs. On the other hand, China 
received less impact in the global financial crisis and the massive stimulus package started to 
take effect from the second half of 2009 and stabilized the travel demand. The drop in marginal 
cost coupled with the stable airfares might have resulted in a higher Lerner index in 2009-2010.  
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have examined the price effects of two Chinese airline mergers: the MU-FM 
merger with a more parallel network and the CA-ZH merger with a more complementary 
network. In general, we found that the products affected by the mergers show significant 
increases in airfares relative to the control group. A further examination of the prices in the 
short run and long run suggests that the price effects triggered by airline mergers could change 
over time. For both mergers, the price rises were larger in magnitudes in the long term relative 
to the short term. Their patterns have been verified by the calculated Lerner indices, suggesting 
that substantial market power might not have arisen shortly after the merger until a few years 
later. 
Our findings have important policy implications for the anti-trust regulators. Traditional 
wisdom suggests that anticompetitive effects mainly exist on overlap routes or in hub-to-hub 
markets following mergers or alliances. However, in this paper, we found that although the CA-
ZH merger involved fewer overlapping products and more non-overlapping products than the 
MU-FM merger, airfares of the products affected by the CA-ZH merger also significantly 
increased post-merger, suggesting that the elimination of potential competitors can also confer 
market power to the merging airlines. Although we should be careful in ascribing the long-run 
 
13 We thank one anonymous reviewer for raising this issue and giving the insights.  
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increase in market power to the 2010 mergers alone, anti-trust authorities should understand 
that in assessing the potential anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger, the long-term 
effects should be taken into consideration as well as the market access conditions, no matter the 
merger is of complementary or parallel nature. 
With the rapid development of HSR network in China, airline-HSR cooperation has been 
topical and various theoretical models have been developed such as Xia et al. (2018). However, 
more empirical studies are needed to confirm the weakened negative impact of HSR on airfares 
revealed in this study by using more recent data. Another valuable extension is to consider 
connecting routes, which have been ignored in this research. This implies that the benefit to 
connecting passengers brought about by the mergers is not accounted for, which is a 
shortcoming of this research. 
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Appendix A1: List of airlines included in the samples  
  Table A1. List of airlines included in the study 
IATA Code Airline Name Airline Type Year of 
 HU Hainan Airlines Joint venture FSA 1993 
3U Sichuan Airlines Joint venture FSA 1986 
CZ China Southern Airlines State-owned FSA 1995 
FM Shanghai Airlines Joint venture FSA 1985 
CA Air China State-owned FSA 1988 
MF Xiamen Airlines Joint venture FSA 1984 
HO Yunyao Airlines Private FSA 2005 
MU China Eastern Airlines State-owned FSA 1988 
EU Chengdu Airlines Joint venture FSA 2010 
ZH Shenzhen Airlines Joint venture FSA 1992 
SC Shandong Airlines Joint venture FSA 1999 
8C East Star Airlines Private FSA 2009 
8L Lucky Air Private LCC 2004 
BK Okay Air Private FSA 2005 
G5 China Express Airlines Private FSA 2006 
PN West Air Private LCC 2006 
GS Tianjin Airlines Joint venture FSA 2009 
CN Grand China Air Private FSA 2007 
NS Hebei Airlines Joint venture FSA 2010 
VD Kun Peng Airlines Private FSA 2007 
JD Capital Airlines  Joint venture FSA 2010 
KY Kunming Airlines Joint venture FSA 2009 
OQ Chongqing Airlines Joint venture FSA 2007 
9C Spring Airlines Private LCC 2003 
JR Joyair Joint venture FSA 2009 
TV Tibet Airlines State-owned FSA 2011 
KN China United Airlines Joint venture LCC 2012 
GJ Loong Air Private FSA 2011 
DZ Donghai Airlines Private FSA 2002 
DR Ruili Airlines Private FSA 2012 
QW Qingdao Airlines Joint venture FSA 2013 
YI Ying’an Airlines Private FSA 2010 
UQ Urumqi Airlines Joint venture FSA 2013 
FU Fuzhou Airlines Joint venture FSA 2014 
GX Beibu Gulf Airlines Joint Venture FSA 2015 
AQ 9 Air Private LCC 2014 
GY Colorful Guizhou Airlines Joint venture FSA 2014 
Y8 Suparna Airlines Private FSA 2002 
RY Jiangxi Airlines Joint venture FSA 2014 
9H Air Chang’an Joint venture FSA 2000 
A6 Air Travel Private LCC 2016 
GT Air Guilin Joint venture FSA 2015 
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Appendix A2: Calculating the value of 𝜽𝜽 
Following Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993), and Oum et al. (1993), the conduct parameter is 
defined as: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑
𝑦𝑦𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝 −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝
 ∙ 𝜂𝜂
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
, (4) 
                    
where 𝜂𝜂 = − (𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝⁄ )(𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑⁄ ) is the (positive) price elasticity of demand, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑⁄  is the 
market share of firm i, and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is the marginal cost of firm i. Combining equation (3) and (4), 
we obtain: 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)−𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖�𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂 − (𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑/𝑦𝑦𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖)𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (5) 
          
Equation (5) can be transferred into  
 ln 𝜂𝜂 + ln 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ln𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 − ln 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃�ln𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 − ln𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + ln(𝜂𝜂 − (𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑/𝑦𝑦𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖)𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). (6) 
 
Let 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ln 𝜂𝜂 + ln 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ln𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 − ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃�ln𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 − ln𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�, and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ln(𝜂𝜂 −(𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑/𝑦𝑦𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖)𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Denote 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�, and let 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐. Equation (6) can be rewritten 
as 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. (7) 
  
If we know the estimated value of 𝜂𝜂, we can calculate the value of 𝜃𝜃. Next, we explain how 
to estimate the elasticity of demand. 
 ln (𝑑𝑑)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝜂𝜂ln (𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼1 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (8) 
 
where ln (𝑑𝑑)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the logarithm form of route-level passenger volume at time t and ln (𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
is the logarithmic form of route-level airfare at time t. 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a matrix of control variables, 
which include route-level population, route-level GDP (a proxy for income), the presence of 
LCC and HSR on the route and route distance. 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖  and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 are route and time fixed effects to 
control for the unobservable route characteristics and time shocks. Model (8) is estimated using 
two-stage linear regression to tackle the endogeneity issue of ln (𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The 25th percentile and 
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the 75th percentile of fitted fares in a market are used as instruments. The results are shown in 
Table A2. 
Table A2 Price elasticity estimation 
 (1) (2) 
Variables 2SLS 2SLS 
lnPrice -0.9675*** -0.9873*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0243) 
lnPOP -0.0208 0.0567 
 (0.0294) (0.0436) 
lnGDP 0.2839*** 0.2709*** 
 (0.0096) (0.0098) 
HSR -0.2287*** -0.2298*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) 
LCC 0.0215*** 0.0187*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) 
lnDistance 0.3868*** - 
 (0.0512) (.) 
Constant 9.1541*** 11.5276*** 
 (0.3688) (0.2867) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Route fixed effects No Yes 
N 65013 65013 
R2 0.18 0.47 
1. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3. To save space, the coefficients of time dummies are not reported. 
Table A2 shows that the price elasticity is approximately 0.99. By inserting this value into 
Model (7), we can obtain the value of 𝜃𝜃, which equals 0.49. 
 
